“Such brazen theft would indicate [1] that Bitcoin would be (in the near future) without sidechains of any kind, and [2] that Bitcoin itself may be in danger from the miners (and we may need to consider using an alternate proof-of-work hash function),” he explained the impact of this setup in his original post on the topic. Like SPV sidechains, drivechains require a soft-forking change to Bitcoin.

In a cooperative consensus algorithm, there is a fixed number of voters. Voters cannot leave and join randomly. All voters know each other and every voter has only one vote. If the majority agree on the value of the data, then the system is working as designed. This can handle over 30,000 transactions per second. Scaling the number of voters can be an issue, because every vote proposed by a voter must be delivered to every other voter in the consortium.
In private blockchains, only specific, pre-chosen entities have the ability to create new transactions on the chain (this is known as “write permissions”). Thus, a private blockchain is a closed network that offers constituents the benefits of the technology, but is not necessarily decentralized or distributed, even among its members. The extent to which each constituent can view (“read”) and create and validate transactions (“write”) is up to the developers of the chain.
Public blockchains provide a way to protect the users of an application from the developers, establishing that there are certain things that even the developers of an application have no authority to do. From a naive standpoint, it may be hard to understand why an application developer would want to voluntarily give up power and hamstring themselves. However, more advanced economic analysis provides two reasons why, in Thomas Schelling's words, weakness can be a strength. First, if you explicitly make it harder or impossible for yourself to do certain things, then others will be more likely to trust you and engage in interactions with you, as they are confident that those things are less likely to happen to them. Second, if you personally are being coerced or pressured by another entity, then saying "I have no power to do this even if I wanted to" is an important bargaining chip, as it discourages that entity from trying to compel you to do it. A major category of pressure or coercion that application developers are at risk of is that by governments, so "censorship resistance" ties strongly into this kind of argument.
RSK is the first open-source smart contract platform with a 2-way peg to Bitcoin that also rewards the Bitcoin miners via merge-mining, allowing them to actively participate in the Smart Contract revolution. RSK goal is to add value and functionality to the Bitcoin ecosystem by enabling smart-contracts, near instant payments and higher-scalability.
The witnesses who put more funds in escrow have a greater chance of mining (or minting) the next block. The incentives line up nicely here. There are only a few witnesses and they get paid to be witnesses, so they are incentivized to not cheat. If they do cheat and get caught, they not only get voted out in favor of the next eagerly awaiting witness, they lose all the funds they had in escrow.
Sidechains are blockchains that allow for digital assets from one blockchain to be used securely in a separate blockchain and subsequently returned to the original chain. The term “sidechain” in this case is used for context, in that the paper initially refers to Bitcoin as the “parent chain” and connected blockchains (altcoins) as “sidechains,” but the term is interchangeable so that altcoins interacting with each other can each be a parent chain interacting with sidechains. You may have also heard of “childchains,” which are also sidechains.
As RSK plans to host all types of clients and smart contracts: financial industry players, educational institutions, large importing companies, government and individuals, which means they are full on attack mode on Ethereum’s business model. There are endless opportunities within a market with unlimited potential and we could now see a first real competitor for Ethereum, that has a big hashrate, secure network, safer environment for developers, much higher throughput and solved scalability issues.
Plasma is a proposed framework for incentivized and enforced execution of smart contracts which is scalable to a significant amount of state updates per second (potentially billions) enabling the blockchain to be able to represent a significant amount of decentralized financial applications worldwide. These smart contracts are incentivized to continue operation autonomously via network transaction fees, which is ultimately reliant upon the underlying blockchain (e.g. Ethereum) to enforce transactional state transitions.
The Loom Network recently released their SDK which supports what they call “Dappchains,” an Ethereum layer-2 sidechain solution with each sidechain comprised of their own DPoS consensus mechanism. This enables highly scalable dapps, specifically games built using their tools. Loom emphasizes the earlier comment about sidechains enabling innovation in scalability, rather than providing it directly. Loom’s sidechains have their own set of rules and are used to offload computation from the primary Ethereum chain. Their sidechains are application-specific, meaning that they enable highly scalable dapps through an efficient consensus mechanism and can periodically be settled on the main Ethereum chain depending on their security needs. You can find more information on their model here.

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