Things get a bit more interesting when you replace the single custodian with a federation of notaries by way of a multisignature address. In this model, a federation of entities must sign-off on movements to and from the sidechain, so more parties must be compromised for a failure situation to unfold where the bitcoins frozen on the main chain are stolen.
Blockchain was invented by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 to serve as the public transaction ledger of the cryptocurrency bitcoin.[1] The invention of the blockchain for bitcoin made it the first digital currency to solve the double-spending problem without the need of a trusted authority or central server. The bitcoin design has inspired other applications,[1][3] and blockchains which are readable by the public are widely used by cryptocurrencies. Private blockchains have been proposed for business use. Some marketing of blockchains has been called "snake oil".[9]
Por lo tanto, y gracias a estas sidechains, se podrían conectar a Bitcoin soluciones con objetivos concretos, complementándole y aprovechando sus ventajas pero con la suficiente independencia. Para ello se usan unas piezas llamadas ‘two-way peg’, que son las encargadas de sincronizar las transferncias (validan y inmovilizan las monedas) entre ambas cadenas: la sidechain cuenta con unas monedas ya minadas pero sin dueño a la espera que, tras el intercambio, queden bajo el control del usuario que llega a esta cadena.

This is justified by observing that, in our pre-sidechain world, miners always want things to be correct. In theory, the incentives of miners and investors are very strongly aligned: both are compensated most when the exchange rate is highest. And, in practice, we do not see large reorganizations (where miners can “steal”, by first depositing BTC to major exchanges, then selling that BTC for fiat (which they withdraw), and finally rewriting the last 3 or 4 days of chain history, to un-confirm the original deposits). These reorgs would devastate the exchange rate, as they would cast doubt on the entire Bitcoin experiment. The thesis of Drivechain is that sidechain-theft would also devastate the exchange rate, as it would cast doubt on the entire sidechain experiment (which would itself cast doubt on the Bitcoin experiment, given the anti-competitive power of sidechains).
Public blockchains are open, and therefore are likely to be used by very many entities and gain some network effects. To give a particular example, consider the case of domain name escrow. Currently, if A wants to sell a domain to B, there is the standard counterparty risk problem that needs to be resolved: if A sends first, B may not send the money, and if B sends first then A might not send the domain. To solve this problem, we have centralized escrow intermediaries, but these charge fees of three to six percent. However, if we have a domain name system on a blockchain, and a currency on the same blockchain, then we can cut costs to near-zero with a smart contract: A can send the domain to a program which immediately sends it to the first person to send the program money, and the program is trusted because it runs on a public blockchain. Note that in order for this to work efficiently, two completely heterogeneous asset classes from completely different industries must be on the same database - not a situation which can easily happen with private ledgers. Another similar example in this category is land registries and title insurance, although it is important to note that another route to interoperability is to have a private chain that the public chain can verify, btcrelay-style, and perform transactions cross-chain.
The witnesses who put more funds in escrow have a greater chance of mining (or minting) the next block. The incentives line up nicely here. There are only a few witnesses and they get paid to be witnesses, so they are incentivized to not cheat. If they do cheat and get caught, they not only get voted out in favor of the next eagerly awaiting witness, they lose all the funds they had in escrow.

To most people, Bitcoin itself is already deeply esoteric (and many still find it risible.) But to cryptocurrency aficionados, tired old garden-variety Bitcoin is so five minutes ago. Explaining today’s new cryptocurrency hotness to a general audience is an interesting challenge–I have an engineering degree from a top-tier school and I write software for a living, and I still find much of this material pretty impenetrable on first acquaintance–but here goes:
“Such a move could allow retailers to lower prices and incentivize consumers to shop at one retailer over a competitor,” Cohen noted. “This idea is not as ludicrous as it might seem. Amazon recently registered three cryptocurrency-related domain names, suggesting a potential move into the cryptocurrency space. If large companies like Amazon, Walmart or Starbucks issued digital coins that inspired public trust, blockchain-based cryptocurrencies might gain acceptance by the public and other retail giants.”
A public blockchain is ideal when the network must be truly decentralized, which means that no central entity controls the entry of the members on the network and the consensus mechanism is democratic. A democratic mechanism of consensus means that all members can become a minor and that these miners are in competition to add the blocks to the blockchain (at least when the mechanism of the evidence of the work is used).
That is however not all. Sidechains also have some specific use cases, unique to a certain blockchain. One example is the usage of sidechains in EOS. EOS is currently facing a RAM problem. RAM is too expensive and developers are complaining. Sidechains could compete with the EOS mainchain by having lower RAM prices, this would lead to competition, incentivizing both the EOS mainchain block producers and sidechain block producers (mainchain and sidechains of EOS are maintained by the same group of block producers) to keep the RAM price as low as possible. This also means there is more RAM available, so the RAM price will go down as a result.
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) is what keeps the blockchain fundamentally secure. For simplicity, let’s say there were 100 nodes in a blockchain network (there are currently about 10,500 full Bitcoin nodes in the world). What happens when one node wants to tamper with the latest block and say other Bitcoin users sent him a whole bunch of Bitcoin when they really didn’t?
"Proof of Work" used by Bitcoin is a competitive consensus algorithm. Each node races to solve a difficult puzzle first. Doing so earns the right to produce a block and you are rewarded in Bitcoin. The block is where the transaction (value of data) is written and confirmed. However, this race is a waste of time and money for those that don’t win. You get nothing unless you are the first to solve the puzzle. Since no one wants to lose, nodes started working together to solve the puzzle and share the reward based on your computational power (the hash rate).
A public blockchain has absolutely no access restrictions. Anyone with an internet connection can send transactions[disambiguation needed] to it as well as become a validator (i.e., participate in the execution of a consensus protocol).[84][self-published source?] Usually, such networks offer economic incentives for those who secure them and utilize some type of a Proof of Stake or Proof of Work algorithm.
So, there is a kind of centralized authority that decides who has a right to contribute to and to audit the network. What is more – it’s possible to restrict viewing information stored on private blockchains. It might seem that in such conditions, a blockchain is no longer the blockchain as it lacks transparency and decentralization. Well, these remarks are fair, but only when the network is estimated from the outside. Within it, the rules remain the same as for public networks: it is still transparent for all the members.
Blockchain-based smart contracts are proposed contracts that could be partially or fully executed or enforced without human interaction.[55] One of the main objectives of a smart contract is automated escrow. An IMF staff discussion reported that smart contracts based on blockchain technology might reduce moral hazards and optimize the use of contracts in general. But "no viable smart contract systems have yet emerged." Due to the lack of widespread use their legal status is unclear.[56]